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A FOURTH AMENDMENT STATUS UPDATE:  APPLYING 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTION TO EMPLOYEES’ 
SOCIAL MEDIA USE 
Alexander Naito* 
INTRODUCTION 
“Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of 
power, must have [the] . . . capacity of adaptation to a changing world.”1 
The transformation of the Internet over the past decade has dra-
matically altered the way business is conducted and how offices are 
structured.2  File cabinets are being replaced in favor of electronic 
storage websites;3 letters have all but vanished as e-mail has become 
the preferred form of communication;4 and newspapers are on the 
ropes due in large part because blogs and other non-traditional on-
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is due in large part to the helpful edits and suggestions made by Linda Bartusiak and Pro-
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 1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). 
 2 See Michael L. Rustad & Sandra R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-mail and Internet Usage:  
Avoiding the Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop:  Insights From Europe, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
829, 898 (2005) (“In this era of information technology, where the fixed workplace is be-
ing rapidly displaced by a more protean electronic environment, wireless network con-
nections create a seamless workplace.  In a telecommuting world, an employee’s 
workplace may be anywhere and everywhere.”); David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the 
Cloud:  Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Compu-
ting, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2215–16 (2009) (describing how advancements in network 
technologies allows employees to work collaboratively from remote locations). 
 3 See Brandon Rowley, EMC Corporation (EMC) a Great Play on the Cloud, TRADING WALL ST. 
INVESTMENTS (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.twsinvestments.com/search?updated-
max=2010-10-15T10%3A18%3A00-04%3A00&max-results=10 (“The electronic storage of 
information is a long-term growth story with exponential growth opportunities as more 
companies adopt online databases and the content itself dramatically increases in 
size . . . .”). 
 4 See Carmen Oveissi Field, The Nuts and Bolts of Electronic Discovery—Technology Issues You 
Need to Know, N.J. LAW. MAG., Aug. 2007, at 10 (“The vast majority of one’s day-to-day 
communications in today’s ‘connected’ world is now handled electronically, with a bliz-
zard of emails, text messages and instant messaging conversations largely replacing for-
mal letters and telephone calls.”). 
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line media sources are becoming the go-to place for information.5  
While the full costs and benefits of this social transformation have not 
been fully realized, the legal ramifications are already beginning to 
emerge. 
An area that has been dramatically influenced by this social trans-
formation is employment, specifically the impact of social media on 
the employee/employer relationship.  In 2009, the Philadelphia 
Eagles football team suddenly terminated a part-time employee for 
making critical remarks about the team’s management on Facebook, 
a social networking website.6  Similarly, the Associated Press repri-
manded a reporter for disparaging remarks posted on Facebook,7 
and a North Carolina school district suspended a teacher due to 
comments she posted online regarding several students.8  These few 
examples illustrate a growing trend in the field of employment, one 
that is likely to continue.9 
Social media is widely used10 and acts as both a digital storage site11 
and as a communication device.12  The popularity and the unique 
 
 5 See Matthew Mastromauro, Pre-Trial Prejudice 2.0:  How YouTube Generated News Coverage is 
Set to Complicate the Concepts of Pre-Trial Prejudice Doctrine and Endanger Sixth Amendment Fair 
Trial Rights, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L. 289, 324 (2010) (“Due to the ease of public access, these 
Internet 2.0 websites also serve as some of the increasingly popular sources of media that 
make up the non-traditional news media, including blogs or other private websites that 
provide the average Internet user with his or her news, and have in recent years outpaced 
traditional news sources.”). 
 6 See Facebook Post Gets Worker Fired, ESPN.COM (Mar. 9, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3965039 (“A Facebook post criticizing his 
employer, the Philadelphia Eagles, cost a stadium operations worker his job . . . . Dan 
Leone . . . was unhappy the team let Brian Dawkins sign with the Denver Broncos in free 
agency.  According to the newspaper, Leone posted the following on his Facebook page: 
‘Dan is [expletive] devastated about Dawkins signing with Denver . . . Dam Eagles R Re-
tarted [sic]!!’”). 
 7 David Kravets, AP Reporter Reprimanded for Facebook Posts; Union Protests, WIRED (June 9, 
2009), available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/06/facebooksword. 
 8 T. Keung Hui, Teacher’s Facebook Rant Leads to Suspension, THE CARY NEWS (Feb. 24, 2010), 
http://www.carynews.com/2010/02/24/16203/teachers-facebook-rant-leads-to.html. 
 9 See Press Release, Proofpoint, Inc., Proofpoint Survey Says:  State of Economy Leads to Increased 
Data Loss Risk for Large Companies (August 10, 2009) available at 
http://www.proofpoint.com/news-and-events/press-releases/proofpoint-survey-says-state-
of-economy-leads-to-increased-data-loss-risk-for-large-companies?PressReleaseID=245. (de-
scribing a survey showing that yearly employment terminations related to use of social 
networking sites had increased between 2008 and 2009). 
 10 See generally Devjani Mishra, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Web 2.0.10:  Untangling the Risks of Electron-
ic Social Media and Adapting Your Workplace Policies to Meet Them, in CORPORATE COUNSEL 
INSTITUTE 2010, at 47, 51 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-
1830, 2010) (reporting that in 2010 Facebook had over 400 million users who spent over 
500 billion minutes on the site each month, including 50% of users who log in daily). 
 11 See Sharon Gaudin, Facebook Rolls Out Storage System to Wrangle Massive Photo Stores, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9130959/
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characteristics of social media websites, coupled with the general mi-
sunderstanding employees have regarding the scope of their legal 
workplace protections,13 has caused this emerging technology to be-
come a major source of discomfort in employment relationships.  As 
a result, the use of social media has led to recent legal challenges by 
both employees and employers.14  The courts have been slow to catch 
up, as has often been the case with emerging technology,15 thereby 
leaving employees and employers with little guidance on how and 
when an employee’s Fourth Amendment privacy protection is trig-
gered by the use of social media. 
This Comment will attempt to define the scope of the privacy pro-
tection afforded to public employees through the Fourth Amend-
ment, as it would be applied to the information contained and 
transmitted through social media websites.  This Comment will focus 
solely on the protection afforded to government employees through 
the Fourth Amendment and how it might be applied to social media.  
It will not touch on the very relevant issue of potential Fourth 
Amendment implications based on information gathered from social 
media sites or other Internet sources during the course of a criminal 
investigation.16  Neither will this Comment cover private employees, 
 
Facebook_rolls_out_storage_system_to_wrangle_massive_photo_stores (describing Face-
book’s new storage system, “Haystack,” developed in order to “better handle the growing 
number of photos Facebook has to store”). 
 12 See Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?
note_id=10150162289525301 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (“Facebook is designed to make 
it easy for you to find and connect with others.”). 
 13 See generally Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information:  A Study of Worker Percep-
tions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110 (1997) (challeng-
ing the assumption that employees are sufficiently informed of their legal protections 
based on the results of a survey in which “respondents overwhelmingly misunderst[oo]d 
the background legal rules governing the employment relationship”). 
 14 See Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *1, *6 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 25, 2009) (upholding a jury verdict against defendant based on a violation of the 
federal Stored Communications Act that resulted from the defendant-employer accessing 
the plaintiff-employees’ social networking site); Bynorg v. SL Green Realty Corp., No. 05 
Civ.0305 (WHP), slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2005) (denying defendant-employer’s 
motion for preliminary injunction in a counterclaim suit against plaintiff-employee for 
defamation based on statements posted on employee’s blog). 
 15 See Elizabeth Townsend Gard & Rachel Goda, The Fizzy Experiment:  Second Life, Virtual 
Property and a 1L Property Course, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 915, 927 
(2008) (arguing that while other areas, such as business and education, continue to 
adapt, “courts and laws are notorious for being slow in catching up with new technolo-
gies,” leaving lawyers at a disadvantage by not being as familiar with growing industries). 
 16 See generally Nathan Petrashek, The Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of Online So-
cial Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (2010) (noting that both criminals and po-
lice are increasingly using social networking sites and arguing that the current Fourth 
Amendment search doctrine in criminal cases fails to adequately protect user content). 
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as the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protection is not directly appli-
cable to private employment relationships.17  Finally, this Comment 
will not touch on the many federal statutory claims that would be 
available, and which would have a far higher probability of success, to 
a public employee seeking relief based on an employer gaining access 
to information posted on social media websites.18  Rather, the focus 
here is on a federal constitutional claim based on a violation of the 
implicit right to privacy in the Fourth Amendment. 
Despite the limited scope, this analysis is still relevant for several 
reasons beyond its direct application to the over twenty-three million 
federal, state, and local employees who would be eligible to bring a 
federal claim based on the Fourth Amendment.19  First, many of the 
concepts contained in the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis are 
analogous to those found in many tort-based protections that govern 
the private employment relationship.20  The way the Court analyzes 
the expectation of privacy in the context of online information will, 
therefore, likely be considered in private tort claims against employ-
ers.  Second, a federal recognition of the right to privacy in social 
media would have a reverberating impact on the application of state 
constitution privacy protections.  Many states, unlike the federal con-
stitution, explicitly provide a right to privacy.21  So far these state 
 
 17 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 623, 614 (1989) (holding that 
the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches conducted by private employers, un-
less the private party acts as an instrument or agent of the Government). 
 18 There are a number of federal statutory claims an employee could bring based on unau-
thorized accesses by an employer or third party to information contained on a secure so-
cial media website.  First, there is a possible violation of the federal Stored Communica-
tions Act, which makes it a crime (a) to gain unauthorized access to an electronic 
communication service provider’s facility, and (b) for a public electronic service provider 
to give up any communications held in electronic storage.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2702 
(2006) (subjecting those who intentionally accesses, without authorization, or provides 
access to, the contents of electronic communication to penalties listed in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2701(b)).  Second, the Wiretap Act makes it a crime to intercept a “wire, oral or elec-
tronic communication,” which has been interpreted to include e-mail, unless the com-
munication is readily accessible to the general public.  18 U.S.C. § 2511.  These are mere-
ly a few sources of potential claims arising out of this sort of employment situation. 
 19 TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT 
LAW:  PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 277 (2007). 
 20 See id. at 292 (explaining how the tort of “intrusion upon seclusion” is the most widely 
recognized common-law privacy claim in the employment context and that such a claim 
hinges primarily on whether the intrusion was into an area where the employee had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 21 See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13467 (last visited Nov. 24, 2011) (listing all the 
states with an explicit constitutional right to privacy).  See generally ALASKA CONST. art. I, 
§ 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.”); 
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 (“The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being 
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rights of privacy have rarely been applied, if at all, to electronic and 
Internet usage.22  Courts in some of the states with an explicit right of 
privacy look to federal interpretation of constitutional privacy protec-
tion for “authoritative guidance on the meaning of the state constitu-
tion.”23  Thus, if and how the Court applies the Fourth Amendment 
to social media use by employees would likely impact whether similar 
claims are brought under state privacy laws, as well as how courts 
would respond to such claims. 
The analysis will be broken down into three main section.  In the 
first section I will set up the issue by providing background on the 
Fourth Amendment’s application to employees.  Part I will detail the 
background of the Fourth Amendment and the concerns that gave 
rise to the current standard developed for assessing Fourth Amend-
ment privacy protection in the public workplace.  Part II will give a 
brief overview of social media in its various forms, as well as classify 
the different variations of social media into generalized categories 
that are more workable for doctrinal purposes.  Part III will detail 
some of the legitimate concerns of employers that are implicated by 
an employee’s use of social media, and the methods by which em-
ployers are able to monitor such use.  Finally, Part IV will lay out the 
Court’s current approach to employee privacy claims under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
In the second section I will explain how the Fourth Amendment 
likely does not protect social media use by employees.  Part V argues 
that under the Court’s current Fourth Amendment framework, an 
employer’s surveillance of an employee’s social media use would not 
be a violation for three reasons.  First, the Court would most likely 
hold that employees have no expectation of privacy in social media 
use because it inherently involves disclosure to third parties.  Second, 
even if the Court were to disregard this implicit waiver of privacy, so-
cial media use would still fall outside Fourth Amendment protection 
based on the Court’s use of physical and spatial boundaries for de-
termining whether an employee has an expectation of privacy.24  Fi-
nally, if the Court were to grant the employee a reasonable expecta-
 
of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state in-
terest.”). 
 22 See Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 2, at 842 (“[T]o date, no court has extended state con-
stitutional rights of privacy to e-mail monitoring or electronic surveillance.”). 
 23 Mark Silverstein, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions:  Models for Illinois?, 1989 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 215, 217 (1989). 
 24 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (evaluating an employee’s expectation 
of privacy based on the context of the employment relation, specifically the frequency or 
need of an employer to access the employee’s workspace). 
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tion of privacy, the Court’s most recent decision regarding the scope 
of employee privacy protection25 appears to advance the growing 
trend in Fourth Amendment analysis of giving greater deference to 
the employer in balancing the reasonableness of the expectation 
against the legitimate interests of the employer.26 
Finally, in the third section I will argue that despite these ob-
stacles, the Court should extend Fourth Amendment protection to 
this new technology because there is an expectation of privacy in so-
cial media use in the employment context and because that expecta-
tion can be sufficient to override a legitimate governmental interest.  
My justification for why social media use should be covered by the 
Fourth Amendment is based on the prevalence of social media use, 
its transformation into a means of storing information as opposed to 
just being used to share information, and the general (and growing) 
assumption that such use is private.  That protection, however, should 
not be without limits.  The courts must recognize the unique charac-
teristics of social media and determine a method of evaluating when 
a reasonable expectation should be applied to this new technology.  I 
contend that such an evaluation must take into consideration the 
scope of the audience and the method by which the users attempt to 
secure the information.  Therefore, the Fourth Amendment should 
protect social media use by public employees if the employee takes 
reasonable measures intended to restrict access to their online in-
formation. 
 
 
I.  BACKGROUND ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
“The basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless 
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions by government officials.”27 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable 
searches and seizures” by government agents absent “probable 
 
 25 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010) (regarding an adverse employ-
ment action taken as a result of a review by the government employer of text messages 
sent by a city employee). 
 26 See Michelle Hess, Note, What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment in the Workplace:  Is the Standard 
of Reasonable Suspicion Sufficiently Protecting Your Rights, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 255, 277 (2005) 
(“Unfortunately, the Fourth Amendment rights of employees have been almost complete-
ly eviscerated over time with the explicit sanction of the judicial branch.”). 
 27 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
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cause.”28  Traditionally, this was interpreted as only protecting against 
a government intrusion of an individual’s property interest.29  That 
protection eventually expanded to cover an overarching “expectation 
of privacy,” which some argue had always been the underlying and 
implicit concept of the Fourth Amendment.30  In Katz v. United States, 
the Court expanded the Fourth Amendment’s protection beyond 
mere physical intrusions based on the reasoning that the amendment 
protects “people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”31  That decision is, rightly or wrongly, widely 
considered precedent for the proposition that the “expectation of 
privacy” is the main objective of the Fourth Amendment’s protec-
tion.32 
In broadening the scope of Fourth Amendment protection 
beyond a simple property based analysis, the Court created more am-
biguity as to when the protection applies.  Before Katz, courts applied 
the legal standards developed for determining property interests 
when distinguishing between a valid and an invalid seizure.33  In the 
wake of Katz, courts were suddenly required to make determinations 
as to when a reasonable person would have a legitimate expectation 
of privacy.34  The only guidance offered by the Court as to determin-
ing when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists was a two step in-
 
 28 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 29 See Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause:  The Fourth Amendment’s Principled Protec-
tion of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 580 (2008) (noting that, prior to 1967, the Fourth 
Amendment was only applied to violations of a property interest and that the 
“‘[e]xpectations of privacy’ are a legal fiction of relatively recent invention”). 
 30 See id. at 584–85 (arguing that prior to 1967 the concept of privacy had always been cen-
tral to Fourth Amendment analysis, but that the Court assumed that interest was suffi-
ciently protected by an explicit protection of property). 
 31 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 32 See Bascuas, supra note 29, at 584 (recognizing that the Katz decision is interpreted as so-
lidifying the proposition that the Fourth Amendment guarantees a right to privacy). 
 33 See id. at 580–81 (noting that prior to 1967, violations of “property interests” were con-
strued using their legal definitions).  See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 
509 (1961) (deciding not to reconsider the Court’s previous decisions which held that a 
physical intrusion is necessary in order to claim a Fourth Amendment violation because 
“a fair reading of the record in this case shows that the eavesdropping was accomplished 
by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the peti-
tioners”); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (holding “that the use of 
the detectaphone by Government agents was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment”); 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that a police wiretap on the 
defendant’s phone did not violate the Fourth Amendment violation because such a viola-
tion cannot occur “unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or 
such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion 
of his house”). 
 34 See Bascuas, supra note 29, at 580 (arguing that “‘expectations of privacy’ are subjective 
specters that, like shapes in the clouds, judges view idiosyncratically”). 
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quiry that looked first at the individual’s subjective expectation and, 
second, whether that expectation was “one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.”35  The obvious problem with shifting from a 
concrete property analysis to an abstract privacy analysis is that 
“[p]rivacy is an extremely broad concept.”36  And, unfortunately, the 
Court in Katz offered little specificity as to what a reasonable expecta-
tion would entail.37  The shift ultimately ensured that the Court would 
have to continually revisit the Fourth Amendment’s application in 
order to make it adaptable to the changes in society’s expectations. 
The Fourth Amendment is commonly asserted in the criminal 
context when defendants challenge the admissibility of evidence 
based on the process through which it was acquired.38  The Court, 
however, has interpreted the Amendment as applicable to public 
employees as well, thereby extending the Amendment’s protection to 
cover intrusions by the government in its capacity as an employer.39  
As the Court reasoned, “it would be ‘anomalous to say that the indi-
vidual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth 
Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal beha-
vior.’”40  The scope of the protection afforded by the Fourth Amend-
ment, however, is different depending on whether it is being applied 
to a criminal defendant or a public employee.41  Thus, while it is well 
 
 35 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Haley Plourde-Cole, Back to Katz:  
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Facebook Age, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571, 580 (2010) 
(noting that Justice Harlan’s interpretation of the majority opinion is that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is established by the subjective expectation of the individual, as 
well as the overall expectations of society). 
 36 Bascuas, supra note 29, at 585. 
 37 See Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo:  A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twen-
ty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1312  (2002) (“In the end, both the 
majority opinion [in Katz] and Harlan’s explanation of the phrase ‘reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy’ were sufficiently meager that the task inevitably fell to future courts to de-
fine the phrase more fully.”). 
 38 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465–66 (citing many cases that indicate a Fourth Amendment 
violation will occur when a criminal defendant has his “papers or his tangible material ef-
fects” seized by the government). 
 39 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714 (1987) (“The strictures of the Fourth Amend-
ment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, have been applied to 
the conduct of governmental officials in various civil activities.”); see also Nat’l Treasury 
Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (recognizing that the Fourth 
Amendment “protects individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by the Gov-
ernment, even when the Government acts as an employer”). 
 40 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (quoting Camara v. Muncipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 530 (1967)). 
 41 The Fourth Amendment in the criminal context has what are known as the “warrant re-
quirement” and the “probable cause requirement,” neither of which are necessarily ap-
plicable to the Government in its role as an employer.  See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execu-
tives’ Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989) (holding that the warrant requirement of the 
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settled that the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protection extends to 
public employees, that protection is limited by the legitimate needs of 
public employers to monitor employees and ensure a safe and effi-
cient working environment.42 
II.  THE VARIOUS FORMS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
“We lived in farms then we lived in cities and now we’re gonna live on the 
internet.”43 
There are many new web-based technologies, in addition to social 
media, that are creating new and interesting problems for employ-
ers.44  Social media, however, presents a unique problem for Fourth 
Amendment analysis and emphasizes the shortcomings of the current 
judicial understanding of the Internet in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Unlike e-mail, instant messaging, or even Internet 
search history, social media necessarily has an additional public as-
pect to it because it is shared with a broader range of individuals, as 
opposed to a single recipient.  This presents a more difficult question 
regarding privacy because there is inherently some diminished ex-
pectation of privacy, and because it cannot as easily be analogized to 
older forms of technology.45  It is, therefore, important to distinguish 
 
Fourth Amendment did not apply to government searches in its role as employer because 
such a burden would “frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search” (quoting 
Camara, 387 U.S. at 533)); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) 
(“[A]nd when a warrant is not required (and the Warrant Clause therefore not applica-
ble), probable cause is not invariably required . . . .”). 
 42 See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 724 (rejecting the application of a probable cause requirement 
for government intrusion of the reasonable privacy of a public employee because “public 
employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is 
conducted in a proper and efficient manner”). 
 43 THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010) (quoting Sean Parker, played by Justin 
Timberlake). 
 44 See Matthew E. Swaya & Stacey R. Eisenstein, Emerging Technology in the Workplace, 21 LAB. 
L. 1, 2 (2005) (describing how e-mail and instant messaging use by employees can create 
many pitfalls for employers who fail to adequately implement policies addressing such 
use); Jayni Foley, Note, Are Google Searches Private?  An Originalist Interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment in Online Communication Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 447, 447–48 (2007) 
(analyzing privacy protections for Internet search history and the “digital footprint” In-
ternet users leave with their Internet Service Provider). 
 45 E-mail and text messaging can be analogized to phone conversations and letters, both as 
to the method of communication and that they are sent to specific recipients.  Thus, the 
analysis as to the reasonableness of the expectation regarding those forms of technology 
is more concrete because there is prior case law regarding those methods of communica-
tions.  Likewise, electronic storage websites, which are increasingly being used by more 
and more employers, could easily be likened to physical storage units.  Under that analo-
gy, the electronic storage units would undoubtedly be given Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. 
858 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:3 
 
social media from other forms of web technology in order to properly 
understand why it is going to become a hotbed of employment litiga-
tion, and how it needs to be specifically addressed by the Court in or-
der to properly be squared with the current Fourth Amendment 
framework. 
A social media site typically incorporates one or more of the fol-
lowing:  blogs,46 microblogs (Twitter),47 social networks (Facebook, 
MySpace, LinkedIn),48 media sharing (YouTube),49 wikis,50 and virtual 
worlds.51  The main difference between these elements of social me-
dia and other web based technologies, such as electronic communica-
tion (like e-mail and instant messaging)52 and online storage (like 
Mozy),53 is the sharing aspect.  All of the previously listed types of so-
cial media, to varying degrees, intend that the information be shared 
with other people besides an intended recipient.  In most cases, un-
like e-mail and text messaging, the information does not have an in-
tended receiver; rather it is posted for viewing by a group whose 
 
 46 “Blogs—Web logs or journals, in which site authors and users can post textual, audio or 
video content and, in may cases, comment on others’ blog posts.”  Mishra, supra note 10 , 
at 50. 
 47 “Microblogs—Sites and spaces allowing users to post short blog entries (usually 160 charac-
ters or less).”  Id. 
 48 “Social Networks—Sites at which users create customized profiles and form connections 
with other users based upon shared characteristics and interests . . .”  Id.; see also Petra-
shek, supra note 16, at 1500–01 (“An online social network can therefore be defined as an 
online service that encourages self-disclosure by requiring members to populate a profile 
with personal information and allows them to create a virtual community by linking their 
personal profile with those of other members.”). 
 49 “Media Sharing—Sites to which users post and share videos, audio files and/or photos as 
well as tag them to enable searchability.”  Mishra, supra note 10, at 50. 
 50 “Wikis—Resources or documents edited collaboratively by a community of users with vary-
ing levels of editorial control by the website publisher.”  Id. 
 51 “Virtual Worlds—Web or software-based platforms that allow users to create avatars or re-
presentations of themselves, and through these avatars to meet, socialize and transact 
with other users.”  Id. 
 52 “Instant messaging is the exchange of ‘text messages in real time between two or more 
people logged into a particular instant messaging (IM) service.  Instant messaging is more 
interactive than e-mail because messages are sent immediately, whereas e-mail messages 
can be queued up in a mail server for seconds or minutes.’”  Steven Goode, The Admissibil-
ity of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 16 n.64 (2009) (quoting Definition of:  Instant 
Messaging, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/ (search “instant mes-
saging”) (last visited Sept. 20, 2010)). 
 53 Mozy is one of the leading companies that provides online backup service.  Users auto-
matically transmit data from their personal or work computers to a secure database main-
tained by Mozy and then are able to retrieve that information if their computer is dam-
aged or information is lost.  See About Mozy, MOZY, http://mozy.com/about (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2011). 
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members may or may not have been limited by the original poster.54  
Due to this unique feature, the exclusivity of the audience is para-
mount in assessing an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
in social media use, and that exclusivity is dependent on the various 
security features offered by different social media sites. 
Even after assessing the form of the social media in question, no 
legal analysis of social media is complete without evaluating the secu-
rity features employed by the user.  The security features of social 
media sites should be a central component to any inquiry into de-
termining the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to this tech-
nology.  The security technology varies from site to site, even from 
user to user within a single site, and with it so too does the reasona-
bleness of the user’s expectation of privacy.  Some sites may require 
viewers to have a password (presumably provided by the author of the 
content) to access the site where the information is posted.55  Other 
sites allow authors to select, either individually or as a group, viewers 
who will be able to see the information disseminated on the social 
media site.56  Finally, another way users attempt to protect their priva-
cy is through the use of pseudonyms and avatars, which attempt to 
shield the identity of the user from whoever views the content.57  
 
 54 On Facebook and Twitter users can make “status updates” or “tweets,” which can then be 
viewed by other users.  A user can limit who has access to their “status updates” or 
“tweets” by altering their security settings.  See Petrashek, supra note 16, at 1507 (“Face-
book offers users an advanced series of privacy settings to restrict others’ ability to access 
their profile content.  Users can control the visibility of nearly all the information shared 
through Facebook, including their . . . status updates and comments.”). 
 55 See Wendi S. Lazar et al., Outten & Golden LLP, Do Employees Have Privacy Rights in the Dig-
ital Age?, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION 2010, at 217, 228 (PLI Li-
tig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. H-828, 2010) (warning that an em-
ployer’s technology policy may not negate privacy violations, especially when it involves 
“restricted-access social networking site profiles or password-protected blogs”). 
 56 See Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-
info#howweuse (last visited Nov. 20, 2011) (“While you are allowing us to use the infor-
mation we receive about you, you always own all of your information.  Your trust is impor-
tant to us, which is why we don’t share information we receive about you with others un-
less we have: . . . received your permission; . . . given you notice, such as by telling you 
about it in this policy; or . . . removed your name or any other personally identifying in-
formation from it.”). 
 57 Pseudonyms are most commonly used on the Internet to create user identifications for 
the purchase and sale of items, but they are also used to shield the user from being iden-
tified.  See Bert-Jaap Koop et al., Bridging the Accountability Gap:  Rights for New Entities in the 
Information Society?, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 497, 502 (2010) (“In some situations, the 
pseudonym is used to conceal the true identity of the person, acting as a privacy-
enhancing tool.  Pseudonyms also function as user IDs in the information society.  On the 
Internet, many people use a pseudonym (or multiple pseudonyms) to stay anonymous.”).  
On the other hand, avatars are intended to be representations of the user within the con-
text of online games and virtual realities.  Those representations, however, can them-
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These varying degrees of security impact the reasonableness of the 
expectation of privacy one has in the information provided through 
social media.  If the Court were eventually willing to extend Fourth 
Amendment protection to social media use, it would have to consider 
these security features in determining the extent to which an em-
ployee has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  While most of these 
social media sites are making it easier to limit who has access to the 
user’s information, a user could fail to take advantage of these meas-
ures, thereby opening up their online profile to anyone with a com-
puter. 
In order to keep track of the variety of forms that electronic 
communication and social media can take, it is helpful to create ge-
neralized categories in which to classify those forms.  For the purpos-
es of this Comment, I will create three categories of electronic com-
munication and social media in order to help analyze how the Fourth 
Amendment applies to them.  The first category, which I will call 
“Level I,” consists of all electronic storage and direct communication.  
This category includes any electronic transformation of information 
that is either intended to be stored, meaning it is not intended to be 
viewed by anyone, or any information intended to be sent to a single 
recipient or class of recipient (e-mails, instant messaging, Facebook 
messages).  “Level II” will include any electronically transmitted in-
formation that is intended to be viewed by a pre-selected group.  This 
is what I will call the “limited sharing of information” and includes 
such things as Facebook “posts,” any “profile” information that is visi-
ble only to a certain class of individuals predetermined by the content 
author, or any password-protected blogs.58  Finally, “Level III” involves 
what I call “unlimited sharing of information,” whereby the content 
author disseminates information online that is available to anyone 
who has access to the social media site.  For example, a Tweet, Wiki-
pedia post or comment posted on a third party website would fall in 
this last category.  Ultimately, there are many variations on the many 
forms social media can take, and it is difficult to make legal determi-
nations on broad generalizations.  These categories, however, are 
 
selves be used as mechanisms for disguising one’s identity.  See id. at 504 (“Avatars are ent-
ities featured in computer games and other online environments . . . [s]uch digital ava-
tars represent the player in the game world . . . [t]he term avatar does not only refer to 
three-dimensional representations in virtual games, but also to the icons representing a 
specific user in an online forum or any other graphical representation of a computer us-
er.”). 
 58 Note that Level II classification will often depend on the security measures taken by the 
users, so it is possible for the same type of social media outlet to be both Level II and Lev-
el III, depending on the user. 
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useful because they are based on some of the underlying principles, 
such as disclosure and access, which are important in a Fourth 
Amendment analysis. 
III.  LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS 
“By releasing stolen and classified documents, WikiLeaks has put at risk not 
only the cause of human rights but also the lives and work of these 
individuals.”59 
The increased use of social media creates many concerns for em-
ployers and provides legitimate reasons for wanting to monitor more 
closely the content distributed by their employees onto such sites.  
Coupled with a growing ability to be successful in monitoring elec-
tronic use by an employee, there is no doubt that this issue has and 
will continue to create a lingering tension between employers and 
employees.  These concerns are important because even if there is an 
expectation of privacy in social media use, there is still a possibility 
that an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights could be superseded 
by the legitimate needs of the government employer who accesses the 
information in a reasonable way.  This Part addresses what those 
needs might be and what ways an employer can and does monitor its 
employees’ use of electronic information sharing. 
A major concern for government employers is the potential to be 
held liable for the use of social media by their employees.  Co-worker 
harassment represents one potential area of liability, whereby “[a]n 
employer is liable for co-worker harassment if it knew or reasonably 
should have known about the harassment and fails to take appropri-
ate remedial action.”60  Thus, if an employer who has access to an 
employee’s online social media forum, and through that access has 
the ability to witness “harassing comments or offensive dialogue be-
ing exchanged among employees and does nothing, the employer 
may later be accused of having knowledge of co-worker harassment 
and failing to respond.”61  The employer may not even have actual 
knowledge of the harassing conduct; the access alone may be enough 
to bring a claim.  Indeed, this form of liability has already been ac-
 
 59 David Leigh, US Embassy Cable Leak Sparks Global Diplomatic Crisis, (Nov. 28, 2010, 1:13 PM) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cable-leak-diplomacy-crisis 
(quoting Press Release, Office the Press Secretary, the White House (Nov. 28, 2010) 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/28/statement-press-
secretary). 
 60 Laura Thalacker & Jelly Kichline, Pitfall Potential:  The Risk of Social Media, 18 NEV. LAW. 
16, 17 (2010) (emphasis omitted). 
 61 Id. at 18. 
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cepted as a plausible cause of action and, therefore, electronic ha-
rassment between co-workers is a legitimate concern.62 
Another way employee social media use puts an employer risk due 
is in a defamation suit.  An employer is liable for the actions of an 
employee if the employee harms someone while acting in the scope 
of their employment.63  If an employee writes defamatory remarks re-
garding someone in their role as an employee, such as a customer, 
the employer could be liable.64  These concerns are legitimate be-
cause they directly affect the financial stability of the employer as well 
as other employer interests.  There are also a slew of less direct em-
ployer concerns based on social media use, including:  the loss of 
trade secrets,65 workplace productivity,66 and reputation of the em-
ployer.67 
 
 62 See Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 543 (N.J. 2000) (reversing a motion to 
dismiss in favor of defendant company who failed to take action in response to harassing 
comments made on a company electronic bulletin board by an employee against another 
employee because, “[a]lthough the electronic bulletin board may not have a physical lo-
cation within a terminal, hangar or aircraft, it may nonetheless have been so closely re-
lated to the workplace environment and beneficial to Continental that a continuation of 
harassment on the forum should be regarded as part of the workplace”). 
 63 The common law doctrine of respondeat superior holds that an employer may be liable for 
the actions of an employee if those actions take place within the scope of employment.  
See 27 AM. JUR. 2D Emp’t Relationship § 373 (2010) (“Under the theory of respondeat supe-
rior, an employer can be held vicariously liable for an employee’s tortious act against the 
person or property of a third party in the transaction of the employer’s business.  Res-
pondeat superior liability extends to cases where the risk was one that may fairly be re-
garded as typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise undertaken by the employ-
er.”). 
 64 See Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 231, 234 (Cal. App. 2008) (protecting the identity of 
the pseudonymous posters who contributed to a conversation on a financial message 
board that “devolved into scathing verbal attacks on the corporate officers of a Florida 
company, prompting a lawsuit by one of those officers”). 
 65 An employer always has an interest in making sure its employees are not divulging trade 
secrets because such conduct can be detrimental to the business.  This concern is heigh-
tened with the emergence of social media because users have begun to provide substan-
tial details about their daily activities, and by doing so, may unknowingly express informa-
tion (such as scheduling, rotations, etc.) that is confidential. 
 66 Workplace productivity may be one of the biggest concerns for an employer, but it is hard 
to say whether it is indeed legitimate for the purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis.  
While employees do spend an enormous amount of time on these sites, the concern is 
not about the information being disseminated, rather it is the very act of being online 
that is causing detriment to the employer.  See Renee M. Jackson, Social Media:  Counsel for 
Clients and Firm Managers, LAW OFF. MGMT. & ADMIN. REP. (Apr. 2010), at 1, 14 (“The 
most obvious hazard regarding the use of social media during employment is internal to 
the organization:  Employees may spend so much time using social media during working 
hours that productivity decreases.”); see also Ryann MacDonald & Brendan Kroepsch, 
Workplace Privacy:  The Social, Technical, and Ethical Ramifications, in TECHNOLOGY AND 
PRIVACY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 137 (Kai Larsen & Z. Voronovich eds., 2004) (noting 
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Finally, certain public employment positions create an even great-
er interest in monitoring employee conduct based on the sensitive 
nature of information the employee has access to.  As exemplified by 
the recent WikiLeaks controversy, whereby a social media site pub-
lished thousands of classified government documents, governmental 
employers clearly have a legitimate interest in monitoring the social 
media use of their employees in order to ensure confidential go-
vernmental information is not distributed unlawfully.68  The ramifica-
tions for failing to adequately monitor employees in this context 
could range from mere public embarrassment69 to putting lives at 
risk.70  Thus, no matter how extensive an employee’s expectation of 
privacy, it should be noted that in certain situations the needs of the 
employer would take priority. 
Employers’ legitimate concerns led to new and innovative ways of 
monitoring workers.  As employees have benefited from the rise in 
technology, so too have employers benefited from new methods of 
electronic surveillance.  Thus, due to the many legal and financial 
repercussions that can result from an employee’s use of social media, 
many employers have made it their practice to monitor such action.  
Before, during and even after employment, employers check up on 
their employees to make sure that they do not harm the company.  
 
that “62% of employees admitted to using the Internet for personal use on a daily basis, 
and 44% use their company e-mail account for both work and personal use”). 
 67 The reputation of the employer is at a far greater risk since the emergence of social me-
dia sites.  In some cases, the employee may not even be aware that his or her use of the 
sites is generating a negative image of his or her employer.  For example, Facebook has 
what is known as “community pages” which are general sites dedicated to certain topics 
(or businesses) developed based on information provided in personal profiles.  See Kash-
mir Hill, Law Firm Facebook Pages Reveal How Associates Really Feel (June 1, 2010, 3:05 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/law-firm-facebook-pages-reveal-how-associates-really-
feel. 
 68 See Joshua Norman, How WikiLeaks Enlightened Us in 2010, CBS NEWS (Dec. 31, 2010, 7:50 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20026591-503543.html?tag=cbsContent
;cbsCarousel (describing the most relevant and impactful revelations resulting from the 
release of two-thousand confidential government documents by WikiLeaks). 
 69 See Joshua Norman, U.S. Envoy to Libya Wikileaks’ First Casualty?, CBS NEWS (Jan. 5, 2011, 
11:01 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20027335-503543.html (describ-
ing how the U.S. ambassador to Libya may be replaced as a result of embarrassing details 
regarding his relationship with his nurse being made public when WikiLeaks released 
thousands of classified documents). 
 70 See Adam Levine, Rights Groups Express Concerns About WikiLeaks, CNN (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-10/us/wikileaks.rights.groups_1_wikileaks-julian-
assange-rights-groups?_s=PM:US (describing how some activist groups have expressed 
concerns that the information contained in some of the documents released by Wiki-
Leaks would put specific Afghanistan citizens in danger of being targeted by the Taliban 
for helping Western troops). 
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But even beyond preventing harm to the company, employers utilize 
this method of surveillance to evaluate whether or not an individual 
should be hired or remain employed.  One of the main areas that 
employers make use of social media monitoring is in pre-employment 
screening.71  Employers also monitor employees’ electronic commu-
nication during the course of employment by using “flagging” soft-
ware.72  This software screens an employee’s electronic communica-
tions, such as e-mails, for certain words or phrases and then sends 
these flagged messages to an employer representative.73  Several gov-
ernment agencies are using flagging software and it is likely to be-
come only more prevalent in public workplaces.74  A second impor-
tant monitoring device utilized by employers is “keystroke logging,” 
whereby an employer can track what a specific employee views, and 
even go so far as logging every single keystroke.75  This technology 
can be valuable for monitoring social media because social media 
websites often require user passwords in order to view the content.  
Keystroke logging would provide employers the ability to obtain such 
passwords if the employee accessed the site using an employer’s com-
 
 71 With so many factual inaccuracies provided by job applicants, and with potential expo-
sure to liability based on employee conduct, employers turn to social media as an addi-
tional tool to perform background checks on potential employees.  See Michael Jones et 
al., The Ethics of Pre-Employment Screening Through the Use of the Internet, in THE ETHICAL 
IMPERATIVE IN THE CONTEXT OF EVOLVING TECHONLOGIES 43–44 (Dan McIntosh et al. 
eds., 2004) (noting that nearly 50% of resumes contain factual errors, which in turn has 
led to “[a] growing trend in the business world today . . . to use internet search engines 
and social networking sites to screen job applicants,” specifically citing a survey indicating 
that “26% of hiring managers have used internet search engines to research prospective 
employees, while 12% say they have used social networking sites”).  Recently, the Court 
unanimously held that while potential government employees do have a privacy interest, 
that interest is subservient to the government’s need to perform background checks.  See 
NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 758 (2011) (“As this long history suggests, the Govern-
ment has an interest in conducting basic employment background checks.  Reasonable 
investigations of applicants and employees aid the Government in ensuring the security 
of its facilities and in employing a competent, reliable workforce . . . .  We hold . . . that, 
whatever the scope of this [privacy] interest, it does not prevent the Government from 
asking reasonable questions . . . in an employment background investigation.”). 
 72 Matthew E. Swaya & Stacey R. Eisenstein, Emerging Technology in the Workplace, 21 LAB. L. 1, 
9 (2005). 
 73 Id. 
 74 See id. (“Both the Department of Justice and the Department of Energy, for example, re-
portedly installed software that censored employee e-mails containing inappropriate lan-
guage.”). 
 75 See id. (“Some keystroke logging devices record the identity of employees who access em-
ployer databases and can track what the employees viewed.  Other keystroke logging de-
vices are more precise, logging every key touched by a particular employee, and saving 
that information on a separate server.”). 
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puter.76  A question might be raised as to the reasonableness of the 
method of using these devices; however, courts would most likely 
consider such methods permissible.77 
This Part was intended to illustrate that not only do employers 
have legitimate interests in monitoring an employee’s use of social 
media, but that they also have the capability to do so.  Any Fourth 
Amendment analysis into an employee’s privacy protection must in-
volve a balance of the employer’s interests and an evaluation as to the 
method by which the employer obtains the information. 
IV.  THE CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYEE 
PRIVACY CLAIMS 
“The American society with which I am familiar ‘chooses to dwell in 
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance . . . .’”78 
The current Fourth Amendment analysis in the employment con-
text, and the one reaffirmed in City of Ontario v. Quon, comes from 
O’Connor v. Ortega.79  In O’Connor, the Court held that public em-
ployees can have Fourth Amendment privacy protection in the 
workplace, depending on the reasonableness of the expectation of 
 
 76 It should be noted that employees may retain an expectation of privacy even as to infor-
mation stored on an employer-owned computer hard drive, depending on the expressed 
expectation policies of the employer.  See Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (noting that there could be a right to privacy in employer-owned equipment 
provided to employees so long as the employer has not destroyed any expectation of pri-
vacy by declaring a policy of inspecting the equipment).  However, here we are talking 
not about locally stored files, but rather virtually stored passwords to information. 
 77 These methods of monitoring employees are analogous to global positioning satellite 
(“GPS”) tracking devices that employers put on company vehicles.  Furthermore, “courts 
that have considered the issue have concluded that an employer may install a GPS device 
in an employer-owned vehicle.”  Kendra Rosenberg, Location Surveillance by GPS:  Balanc-
ing an Employer’s Business Interest with Employee Privacy, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 143, 152 
(2010).  Therefore, most likely these other monitoring practices would not be successfully 
challenged so far as the method of gathering the information is concerned.  It is possible, 
however, that a distinction could be drawn from these types of cases by the value of the 
asset that the employer is monitoring.  Courts might be more inclined to accept employ-
er-monitoring practices if they center on an employer-owned asset, such as a company 
computer’s hard drive, as opposed to monitoring information contained on a third party 
server. 
 78 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 56 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
 79 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628–29 (2010) (explaining that the case can 
be decided without clarifying the two approaches taken in O’Connor because both the 
plurality and Justice Scalia’s opinion would lead to the same result based on the facts of 
the case). 
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privacy.80  The Court set up a two-part analysis for courts to use in as-
sessing Fourth Amendment workplace privacy claims and for deter-
mining whether an employee’s constitutional rights were violated.81 
The first part of the test looks to see whether the employee had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area intruded on by the em-
ployer or in the object of the search.82  The O’Connor opinion offered 
two distinct approaches for this initial inquiry. The Quon decision, 
however, failed to clarify which standard is the appropriate one be-
cause it determined that under either standard the plaintiff had an 
expectation of privacy.  Therefore, the question as to which standard 
applies remains open.83 
The plurality sets up an “operational realities” framework for ana-
lyzing the reasonableness of the expectation.84  Under this standard 
reasonableness is extremely contextual and determined on a case-by-
case basis taking into consideration the work environment and the 
employment relationship.85  Justice Scalia concurred that an em-
ployee could have a reasonable expectation of privacy, but disagreed 
with the plurality’s “operational realities” approach to assessing that 
expectation largely because it left an “open invitation for employers 
to regulate privacy out of existence by manipulating the context of 
the workplace.”86  Scalia therefore argued that, as a general matter, 
 
 80 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (rejecting the argument that “public 
employees can never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of work”); see 
also Justin Conforti, Somebody’s Watching Me:  Workplace Privacy Interests, Technology Surveil-
lance, and the Ninth Circuit’s Misapplication of the Ortega Test in Quon v. Arch Wireless, 5 
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 461, 472–73 (2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court announced that pub-
lic-sector employees may enjoy some privacy in the physical workplace, such as desks and 
file cabinets, based on whether the context of a particular workplace fosters within the 
employee a reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
 81 See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 719 (deciding first that the employee had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy before looking at whether the search was reasonable); see also Conforti, su-
pra note 80, at 473 (“To guide lower courts in investigating Fourth Amendment 
workplace privacy claims, the plurality applied a two-part inquiry.”). 
 82 See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715 (noting that Fourth Amendment rights are only implicated 
if the conduct “infringed ‘an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable’”) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). 
 83 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the majority failed to 
resolve whether the plurality opinion in O’Connor is controlling). 
 84 See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (noting that while employees do not lose their Fourth 
Amendment rights “merely because they work for the government . . . [t]he operational 
realities of the workplace, however, may make some employees’ expectations of privacy 
unreasonable”). 
 85 Id. at 718. 
 86 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring); Conforti, supra note 80, at 474. 
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public employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the 
contents of their offices.87 
If there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the Court 
looks to see whether the employer’s intrusion was reasonably justi-
fied.88  According to the plurality, determining whether or not a 
search was reasonable requires balancing the nature of the intrusion 
against governmental needs.89  This balancing test must be applied in 
two stages:  first it must be applied to the justification for the search; 
and second, it must be applied as to the conduct of the search.90  
Thus, when conducted for a non-investigatory, work-related purpose 
or for the investigation of work-related misconduct, a government 
employer’s search is reasonable if it is justified at its inception and if 
the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the 
search and not excessively intrusive in light of the circumstances giv-
ing rise to the search.91 
V.  SOCIAL MEDIA UNDER THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK 
“The extent to which the Fourth Amendment provides protection for the 
contents of electronic communications in the Internet age is an open 
question.  The recently minted standard of electronic communication via e-
mails, text messages, and other means opens a new frontier in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence that has been little explored.”92 
As it stands now, the current framework of workplace privacy pro-
tection under the Fourth Amendment would likely not cover social 
media use.  First, social media use would not be given the expectation 
 
 87 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 88 Id. at 719; see also Conforti, supra note 80, at 479 (“The reasonableness of an employer’s 
search has two components.  First, the search must be reasonable at its inception, with the 
employer having some ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up 
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.’  Second, the search 
must be reasonable in scope, which requires the employer to adopt measures that are 
‘reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light 
of . . . the nature of the [misconduct].’” (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26)). 
 89 See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 719 (“A determination of the standard of reasonableness appli-
cable to a particular class of searches requires ‘balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” (quoting United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983))). 
 90 Conforti, supra note 80, at 479. 
 91 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725. 
 92 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
searching an employee’s text messages was reasonable and was not an infringement of 
Fourth Amendment rights), rev’d sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 
(2010). 
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of privacy because of the Third Party Doctrine.93  Second, even if so-
cial media use were exempted from the Third Party Doctrine, a 
straightforward application of either test offered by the Court in 
O’Connor would likely result in the conclusion that no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy exists in most types of social media use.  Finally, 
even if the Court did find a reasonable expectation of privacy, it will 
be difficult for any claim against an employer to pass the Fourth 
Amendment balancing test because the Court gives great deference 
to the employer if notice regarding the potential for electronic moni-
toring is provided. 
A.  Waiver of Privacy 
The reason social media presents a unique problem for Fourth 
Amendment analysis is because of the historical Third Party Doctrine, 
which assumes a privacy expectation is destroyed once disclosure is 
made to a third party.94  This exception was originally acknowledged 
in Katz,95 but was subsequently put into practice in United States v. Mil-
ler, where the Court held that bank records were not subject to 
Fourth Amendment protection because they were not in the individ-
ual’s possession.96  Ultimately, the Third Party Doctrine has come to 
hold that one “has no legitimate expectation of privacy in informa-
tion he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”97 
Social media could be considered to have three stages of third 
party disclosure.  The first stage of disclosure is made to the Internet 
Service Provider (“ISP”), which acts as the conduit through which the 
 
 93 The Third Party Doctrine states that an individual’s expectation of privacy is destroyed 
when he or she discloses the information to a third party.  See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the 
Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008) (“By disclosing to a third party, the 
subject gives up all of his Fourth Amendment rights in the information revealed. . . . ‘In 
other words, a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
disclosed to a third party.’” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 94 See Petrashek, supra note 16, at 1519 (noting that under the current search doctrine, vo-
luntary disclosure to third parties can destroy one’s privacy expectations in shared non-
content information). 
 95 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a sub-
ject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
 96 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly that 
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a 
third party and conveyed by him to Governmental authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confi-
dence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”). 
 97 Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 743 (1979). 
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information travels to its destination.98  This type of third party disclo-
sure is similar to the way a telephone provider or post office acts as a 
third party to phone conversations or letters.  Due to the similarity, a 
court has already applied the Fourth Amendment to content infor-
mation sent through an ISP in the same way it has to the information 
sent through telephone providers and post offices.99  As with tele-
phone calls and letters, however, non-content information, such as 
the subscriber information (i.e. who sent/received the phone 
call/letter) is not protected.100 
In the second stage, social media websites, as with electronic sto-
rage websites, are maintained by a specific entity, such as Facebook, 
which stores much of the information disseminated through the site 
on its third party servers.  Whether or not this would be considered a 
third party disclosure is unclear because the Court has yet to apply 
the Third Party Doctrine to the Internet.101  The only guidance from 
the Court stems from its content/non-content distinction developed 
in Smith v. Maryland,102 and that has little applicability to the Inter-
 
 98 See Internet Service Provider (ISP), BRITANNICA ACADEMIC EDITION, available at 
http://www.britannica.com (search “internet service provider”) (last visited Nov. 23, 
2011) (“[C]ompany that provides Internet connections and services to individuals and 
organizations.  In addition to providing access to the Internet, ISPs may also provide soft-
ware packages (such as browsers), e-mail accounts, and a personal Web site or home 
page. ISPs can host Web sites for businesses and can also build the Web sites themselves.  
ISPs are all connected to each other through network access points, public network facili-
ties on the Internet backbone.”). 
 99 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Given the funda-
mental similarities between email and traditional forms of communication, it would defy 
common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment protection . . . . If we accept 
that an email is analogous to a letter or a phone call, it is manifest that agents of the gov-
ernment cannot compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of an email without 
triggering the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under 
the Sun?  A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 
507, 527–28 (2005) (“[A]s with postal mail and telephone conversations, the sender of e-
mail retains no REP [(reasonable expectation of privacy)] in the addressing components, 
but should retain a REP in the contents.”). 
100 See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Every federal court to 
address this issue has held that subscriber information provided to an internet provider is 
not protected by the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation.”); see also United States v. 
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 504, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that e-mail to/from addresses 
and IP addresses constitute addressing information and are therefore not considered 
“searches” for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
101 Petrashek, supra note 16, at 1520. 
102 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (drawing a distinction between the contents of a telephone call 
and the number dialed, the former being protected by the Fourth Amendment and the 
later falling outside the Amendment’s protection because, “[a]lthough petitioner’s con-
duct may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation private, his con-
duct was not and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number 
he dialed”). 
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net.103  Intuitively, one would assume that information provided to se-
cure Internet websites would be protected, especially in the case of 
electronic storage where the user is paying for a service that guaran-
tees the security of information deposited.  It may seem strange to 
think that this type of information disclosure could be considered 
exempt from Fourth Amendment protection, but it is at the very least 
plausible.104  On the other hand, there has been a strong case made 
for drawing a distinction between an automated recipient and an in-
dividual in applying the Third Party Doctrine.105  That argument con-
tends the Fourth Amendment should protect information transmit-
ted through the Internet to automated equipment run by third 
parties because the information is not being disclosed to a human be-
ing.106  For the purposes of this Comment, I will assume that the 
Court, if presented with the issue, would exempt all Level I social 
media use from the Third Party Doctrine.  Such a conclusion seems 
intuitive and the alternative is undesirable because it would be to 
eliminate all privacy protection in Internet usage.107  Most of all, mak-
ing the assumption leads to the more interesting question regarding 
the third stage of third party disclosure. 
The third stage of third party disclosure in social media is more 
intriguing because it necessarily involves allowing a third party to view 
the information, while at the same time allowing the user to dictate 
who is a member of that third party.  Although social media sites 
cannot be completely depended on to ensure the security of what it 
 
103 See Petrashek, supra note 16, at 1520 (“The distinction between content and non-content 
information breaks down even further on the Internet, where ‘[u]sers disclose both con-
tent and routing information, in exactly the same technical manner, to an enormous 
number of third parties.’”). 
104 See Timothy Lee, Why the ‘Third Party Doctrine’ Undermines Online Privacy Protection,  TECH 
DIRT (June 20, 2008) available at http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080530/
201471272.shtml (“[W]e now entrust a host of private data—including our email, cell 
phone calling data, credit card transactions, and more—to private companies, and [that] 
the third party doctrine would seem to suggest that Fourth Amendment protections 
would not extend to such information.”). 
105 See Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 585–86 
(2011) (arguing that the “courts’ failure to distinguish between the disclosure of personal 
information to automated equipment and disclosure of to a human being” is potentially 
devastating to the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protection in the digital age). 
106 See id. at 616 (arguing that many of the Supreme Court cases regarding the Fourth 
Amendment support the conclusion that the third party requires disclosure to a human 
being, and that the majority of information passed through the Internet is stored by third 
party automated servers and is never reviewed by a human being). 
107 See id. at 602 (noting that because “[v]irtually every kind of personal online data is stored 
and processed by third-party automated equipment,” if the Third Party Doctrine applies 
there will be no expectation of privacy in online communications). 
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posted,108 most users feel they have some control over who can view 
their information.109  This ability to limit the audience would likely 
not be viewed as a sufficient means of curtailing the applicability of 
the Third Party Doctrine.  Courts often defend the Third Party Doc-
trine on the grounds that one who discloses information to a third 
party “assumes the risk” and, therefore, should not be entitled to con-
stitutional protection.110  The same assumption of risk justification will 
likely be employed to defend applying the Third Party Doctrine to 
social media.  Therefore, it is likely that the Third Party Doctrine 
would apply to all Level II and Level III type social media use. 
Under current law regarding the Third Party Doctrine and the In-
ternet, it appears Fourth Amendment privacy protection extends to 
the contents of electronic transmissions (e-mail, instant messaging, 
etc.), but not to their identification information (Internet Provider 
address, etc.).  It also seems likely, but not definitive, that the Third 
Party Doctrine would not apply to information held in secure storage 
websites.  Social media, however, has a third layer of third party dis-
closure, meaning it is even more unlikely that any content informa-
tion provided to social media sites would be protected.  It follows 
from this that, using my generalized categories, it is almost unques-
tionable that Level II and Level III social media use would be consi-
dered a waiver of Fourth Amendment privacy protection. 
 
 
108 See Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=%
20322341825300 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (“Although we allow you to set privacy op-
tions that limit access to your information, please be aware that no security measures are 
perfect or impenetrable.  We cannot control the actions of other users with whom you 
share your information.  We cannot guarantee that only authorized persons will view your 
information.  We cannot ensure that information you share on Facebook will not become 
publicly available.  We are not responsible for third party circumvention of any privacy 
settings or security measures on Facebook.  You can reduce these risks by using common 
sense security practices such as choosing a strong password, using different passwords for 
different services, and using up to date antivirus software.”). 
109 A more complex issue that will not be discussed here is the transfer of information about 
the user to third party advertisers who tailor ads specific to a user’s interest.  See Petras-
chek, supra note 16, at 1520 (“[I]nformation is not simply stored for the convenience of 
the web site user; instead the web site operators collect revenue by using this information 
to display ads tailored to the user’s particular interests.”). 
110 See Kerr, supra note 93, at 564 (noting that the closest the Supreme Court has come to 
justifying the Third Party Doctrine is through the idea that someone who discloses to 
third parties assumes the risk that the information will not remain private). 
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B.  Reasonableness of the Expectation 
The Court’s decision in City of Ontario v. Quon has been criticized 
for failing to provide an update to the Fourth Amendment’s analyti-
cal framework for lower courts to apply to new technology in the em-
ployment context.111  Specifically, commentators attack the Court’s 
failure to address the discrepancy in O’Connor regarding the test for 
establishing the existence of a reasonable expectation,112 instead 
choosing to decide the case on the grounds that even if there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the search was ultimately reasona-
ble and, therefore, not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.113  For 
the purposes of social media, clarification is probably not needed be-
cause, under a straightforward application of either test, social media 
would likely not rise to the level of a reasonable expectation. 
Both tests center on what can be called the “outside/inside dis-
tinction,”114 a distinction dependent entirely on physical spatial fac-
tors for line-drawing purposes.115  The “outside/inside distinction,” 
however, does not allow for either test to apply to social media use.  
First, the plurality’s approach in O’Connor centers on the nature of 
the workplace, specifically the spatial relationship the employee has 
with supervisors, in determining whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists.  Therefore, the employee’s expectation of privacy is as-
sessed by “the nature of government offices that others—such as fel-
low employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general pub-
lic—may have frequent access to an individual’s office.”116  By 
focusing the analysis on the physical accessibility of the employee’s 
 
111 See Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 184–85 (2010) (ar-
guing that the Court should have held that employees have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in text messages, and a failure to do so “opened the door to O’Connor’s continued 
application in such circumstances and inevitably to inconsistent results on account of the 
flexibility of O’Connor’s fact-specific approach”). 
112 See id. at 179 (“Yet instead of clarifying whether a government employee enjoys a reason-
able expectation of privacy when using government-issued equipment, the Court pro-
vided no helpful guidance for similar cases in the future, declining to decide whether the 
Fourth Amendment provides such a reasonable expectation in technological contexts.”). 
113 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (noting that it is not necessary to 
resolve the question of which O’Connor test is controlling because, “[t]he two O’Connor 
approaches—the plurality’s and Justice Scalia’s—therefore lead to the same result here”). 
114 Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet:  A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1005, 1010 (2010) (noting that the distinction between “surveillance outside and 
government surveillance inside is probably the foundational distinction in Fourth 
Amendment law,” and that any government intrusion in the “outside” area is not a Fourth 
Amendment violation). 
115 See id. at 1011 (“In the physical world, the line that the Fourth Amendment protects is the 
line between inside and outside.”). 
116 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987). 
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workplace, the Court fails to cover new technology because it does 
not factor in the accessibility of virtual information.  Under this test, 
an employer will always be allowed access to an employer-owned 
computer and, therefore, the conduct of the employee on that com-
puter will never amount to a reasonable expectation of privacy under 
the plurality’s approach. 
Scalia’s approach offers no direct help to the problem of virtual 
privacy because his opinion also provides guidance for only tangible 
spatial standards.  Scalia argues for clear and explicit areas, such as an 
office and drawers in an office, that necessarily have an expectation 
of privacy.117  Scalia, however, qualifies his proposal by asserting that 
this presumption of privacy can be defeated in situations where “the 
office is subject to unrestricted public access.”118  Under Scalia’s ap-
proach, privacy is still subject to the inside/outside distinction be-
cause the expectation of privacy is determined by the physical open-
ness of the area in question.  So long as the physical and spatial 
distinctions remain foremost in the analysis for employee privacy, 
there is likely no expectation of privacy in social media use. 
C.  Balancing Test 
The Court in Quon did not need to resolve the discrepancy re-
garding the threshold issue in applying the Fourth Amendment to 
public employees because it determined the search was justified.  In 
doing so, the Court applied the second part of the Fourth Amend-
ment analysis developed in O’Connor used for evaluating when a gov-
ernment intrusion against public employees is sufficiently justified to 
trump the reasonable expectation of privacy.119  In Quon, the govern-
ment employee had been issued a cell phone with a coverage plan 
that allowed for a specific number of text messages per month.120  If 
the employee exceeded the limit of text messages, the employer 
would incur additional costs.121  The plaintiff, Quon, went over his al-
lotted number of messages and, in an attempt to determine whether 
there was a need to upgrade the city’s service plan to allow for more 
text messages, the City performed an audit of his text messages to de-
 
117 See id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would hold, therefore, that the offices of govern-
ment employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files within those officers, are covered by 
Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter.”). 
118 Id. 
119 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628–29 (2010). 
120 Id. at 2625. 
121 Id. 
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termine how many were work related.122  In a review of those messag-
es, the City discovered several sexually explicit messages sent by Quon 
during work hours and, as a result, Quon was disciplined.123  He 
brought suit claiming, among other things, that the review of the 
transcripts of the content of his text messages constituted an unrea-
sonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.124  The Ninth 
Circuit agreed with Quon, holding both that Quon had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the text messages and that the search was 
“not reasonable in scope.”125  The Supreme Court overturned the 
Ninth Circuit, noting that it did not matter whether Quon had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy because the search was justified and 
reasonable in scope.126 
The Court held that the search was reasonable because the legiti-
mate government interest outweighed the reasonableness of the ex-
pectation.127  The Court assessed the reasonableness of the search by 
balancing it against the privacy expectation of the individual.128  The 
Court found that the reasonableness of the expectation was not suffi-
cient in large part because Quon was on notice as to the possibility of 
his employer reviewing his text messages.  As evidence that Quon had 
a diminished expectation of privacy, the Court pointed to the City’s 
“Computer Usage, Internet and E-Mail Policy,” which stated, “[u]sers 
should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using 
these resources.”129  Such policies are not novel and many employers 
now have Internet policies that give notice to the employee that the 
employer may monitor the employee’s Internet usage, including so-
cial media use.  Therefore, based on the Court’s reliance on notice to 
the employee, coupled with the Court’s general deference given to 
public employers, it is unlikely that monitoring an employee’s social 
media use would be viewed as amounting to a sufficiently unjustifia-
ble search, such that Fourth Amendment protection would apply. 
 
122 Id. at 2626. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 910 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. 
Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619.  
126 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2627–29. 
127 See id. at 2632 (“Because the search was motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose, 
and because it was not excessive in scope, the search was reasonable under the approach 
of the O’Connor plurality.”). 
128 See id. at 2631 (“[T]he fact that Quon likely had only a limited privacy expecta-
tion . . . lessened the risk that the review would intrude on highly private details of 
Quon’s life.”). 
129 Id. at 2625. 
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VI.  THE CASE FOR SOCIAL MEDIA PROTECTION 
“General suggestions that, in the current climate of ‘over-sharing’ on 
Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter, Americans have acquiesced to ‘the end of 
privacy,’ have been refuted by a number of recent events which reflect a 
growing trend towards maintaining and protecting privacy rights in an age of 
rapidly-evolving technology.”130 
Social media use by government employees should be protected 
under the Fourth Amendment because of changes in how the Inter-
net is used.  The Third Party Doctrine can no longer be employed as 
an effective limit on the expectation of privacy because social media 
has transformed society’s expectations of privacy.  Secondly, the test 
for determining a reasonable expectation in the public employment 
context should divert from the physical/spatial line-drawing analysis.  
If this occurs, then the plurality’s approach in O’Connor should be 
formally adopted because it can adapt so as to include social media.  
Finally, determining if the expectation is sufficiently justified to war-
rant Fourth Amendment protection should be based on the security 
measures available and taken by the employee, and not based on 
whether there was sufficient notice provided by the employer. 
A.  Recognizing an Expectation of Privacy in Social Media:  Rejecting the 
Application of the Third Party Doctrine 
Changes in technology and society have created a need for a ree-
valuation of the Third Party Doctrine.  Social media is founded on vo-
luntary disclosure to third parties, so in the extreme one could con-
sider all social media content as outside the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.  That does not, however, align with the reality of today’s 
world where people have as much of an expectation of privacy using 
these social media sites, much less the Internet, as they do using tele-
phones or storage units.  David Couillard expressed this sentiment by 
noting: 
The Internet is constantly evolving.  The increased speed and mobility of 
Internet access, and the more widespread usage of Internet services and 
digital information, makes the online cloud more than a public me-
dium—it is an anywhere-access point for private data.  Companies and 
individuals turn to the cloud as a convenient and cheap alternative to 
traditional hard drive storage, and society expects its photo albums, ad-
dress books, calendars, documents, and emails to maintain the same pro-
tections on a secure account in the cloud as they would if stored on a 
home computer.  The increased availability and usage of virtual con-
 
130 Plourde-Cole, supra note 35, at 624. 
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cealment tools, such as passwords, encryption, and unlisted links, makes 
these expectations of privacy subjectively reasonable.131 
Thus, it is imperative that the Court reassess, if not altogether aban-
don, the Third Party Doctrine in light of the advancements made in 
technology.  Failure to do so could, arguably, lead to a situation 
where there no longer exists any “expectation” of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment.132 
This is not to say that all Internet use should suddenly be granted 
an expectation of privacy.  By assuming that the Third Party Doctrine 
does inherently remove all expectation of privacy in the Internet, 
however, we can begin to analyze the specific characteristics of differ-
ent types of social media and determine whether a reasonable expec-
tation should nonetheless exist based on the security features and 
who has access to the information.  If a user limits the access to their 
online profile and/or information disseminated through a social 
media website, either by requiring a password or by allowing only cer-
tain other social media users to view the information, then they have 
an expectation that society is ready to recognize as reasonable.  On 
the other hand, if an employee does not take advantage of the many 
security features available on most social media sites, their expecta-
tion is no longer reasonable.  This acknowledgement, of the unique 
characteristics of differing types of social media use, does not neces-
sarily require a complete overhaul or dissolution of the Third Party 
Doctrine.  For example, a social media output, such as a Facebook 
post, whose viewers the user restricts, could be viewed as similar to a 
direct communication (such as a telephone conversation or e-mail).  
Under this interpretation, the Fourth Amendment would still be ap-
plicable unless one of the recipients (i.e., one of the user’s “friends”) 
volunteered the information to the public employer.  Therefore, the 
Third Party Doctrine would not mean that an employee necessarily 
waives their Fourth Amendment protection just by posting informa-
tion online, rather it would depend on the employer’s ability to 
access that information. 
While this offers little guidance to employers and employees, or 
lower level courts for that matter, it does align with the Court’s opi-
 
131 Couillard, supra note 2, at 2238. 
132 See Henderson, supra note 99, at 562–63 (“The REP [(reasonable expectation of privacy)] 
test must be limited to reign in its third party doctrine.  Without external restraint, tech-
nology will lead to an expectation of no privacy, and police practice will incorporate that 
technology to create a reality of no privacy. . . . Restricting the third party doctrine to in-
formation deliberately conveyed in order that its content be used is a necessary step in 
preventing the Fourth Amendment from becoming irrelevant.”). 
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nion in O’Connor and Katz, whereby Fourth Amendment claims must 
be analyzed using a case-specific, fact-intensive inquiry.133  The point 
here is that the Court should not automatically dismiss social media 
use as outside the realm of Fourth Amendment protection based on 
its sharing component, but rather analyze on a case-by-case basis 
whether an expectation of privacy exists as required under current 
Fourth Amendment doctrine.  If viewed in this way, the Third Party 
Doctrine would apply only to Level III type social media use, leaving 
the possibility open for Level I and Level II type use to receive Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
B.  Defining the Expectation:  When Social Media Use Creates a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy 
Reassessing the application of the Third Party Doctrine is only 
part of the battle.  The Court’s two tests offered in O’Connor are both 
based on physical and spatial boundaries, which means social media 
would likely fall outside the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.  
The inside/outside distinction, however, is no longer applicable to 
Fourth Amendment analysis due to changes in technology, so the 
tests should be viewed in a way that accounts for this change.  Ulti-
mately, the plurality approach in O’Connor is best suited to be adapted 
in such a way that will potentially allow the Fourth Amendment to 
cover social media. 
The Court should move away from assessing Fourth Amendment 
privacy based on physical and spatial boundaries because information 
is becoming exclusively stored in the virtual world.  This change must 
be reflected in the analysis the courts take in assessing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  The Court, however, need not adopt a com-
pletely separate approach in light of this social transformation.  The 
plurality approach could be adapted so as to include social media 
use.134  Under the plurality’s approach in O’Connor, social media could 
be incorporated if the focus moved away from the physical nature of 
the workplace and instead looked at the type of work involved.  The 
 
133 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987) (“Given the great variety of work envi-
ronments in the public sector, the question whether an employee has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”). 
134 Scalia’s approach could be adapted to incorporate this change.  His reasoning could be 
used to create strict guidelines for the virtual world as to what is and is not covered under 
the Fourth Amendment.  This approach, however, would provide inadequate protections 
because the types of social media uses and security measures that are applied vary so dras-
tically that any attempt to categorically apply the Fourth Amendment would be fruitless 
and would undoubtedly leave some areas without proper protection. 
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scope of protection would not depend on whether the physical na-
ture of the workplace lends itself to the employer having a need to 
rummage through an employees workspace because the employer 
will always have a legitimate need to search a company-owned com-
puter.  Rather, the scope of protection would depend on the nature 
of the workplace with respect to online activity and the relationship 
the work has to certain types of social media sources.  Accordingly, if 
the nature of the work performed by the employee is such that social 
media use substantially impacts the workplace or the employer, or if 
social media is an integral part of the work being done, then the em-
ployee would not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy.  If, on 
the other hand, the nature of the work had no relationship to social 
media use, then the contents of Level I and Level II type social media 
use should contain a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Ultimately, the Court in Quon did not clarify which O’Connor test 
should be applied in determining expectations of privacy in the 
workplace.  Such a clarification would help future courts grapple with 
the emergence of social media use in the workplace.  Furthermore, 
based on the difficulties associated with applying the Fourth 
Amendment to social media use, the plurality’s approach in O’Connor 
would provide the best framework within which to assess employee 
Fourth Amendment privacy claims.  In using that approach, however, 
the courts should acknowledge the change in technology that makes 
spatial distinctions inadequate. 
C.  Limiting Unreasonable Searches:  Notice as a Non-Factor 
If a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding social media use 
can be established it must also be able to survive O’Connor’s balancing 
test in order to constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.  Currently, 
that test places a heavy emphasis on whether or not notice is provided 
to the employee, essentially allowing any reasonable expectation to 
be destroyed if sufficient notice is given.  Notice, however, should not 
be a determinative factor in deciding the extent to which the expec-
tation is reasonable because an employer should not be allowed to 
bypass an employee’s constitutional rights by merely providing ad-
vanced notice.135  Furthermore, notice does not exempt employers 
from liability under many of the federal statutes, such as the Electron-
 
135 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 
§ 10.8(a), at 335 (4th ed. 2004) (“The Fourth Amendment would be meaningless if the 
‘expectation of privacy’ which it is intended to protect would be dissipated by nothing 
more than advance announcement by the government . . . .”). 
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ic Communications Privacy Act, and so too should it not exempt 
them from constitutional violations.136  Thus, notice should be “simply 
a factor relevant to the analysis and not the final indication of what 
privacy an employee can expect.”137 
Unfortunately, in the aftermath of O’Connor, the lower courts have 
chosen to utilize notice as a bright line rule for valuing the reasona-
bleness of an employee’s expectation against the interest of the em-
ployer.138  In United States v. Simons, the Fourth Circuit upheld a search 
of a computer of an employee for the Foreign Bureau of Information 
Services (“FBIS”).139  The Fourth Circuit based its reasoning on the 
existence of an employer Internet policy that provided the employee 
with notice that Internet use on employer-owned equipment was sub-
ject to search.140  Conversely, in United States v. Slanina, the Fifth Cir-
cuit found that the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his employer-owned computer based on the lack of an employee 
policy.141  The Fifth Circuit held that there was a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy “given the absence of a city policy placing [defendant] 
on notice that his computer usage would be monitored and the lack 
of any indication that other employees had routine access to his 
computer.”142  These cases illustrate the trend, continued in Quon, to-
wards applying a clear, all or nothing approach to the balancing test 
laid out in O’Connor.143  This heavy emphasis on notice, to the point of 
becoming an absolute defense to employee Fourth Amendment 
 
136 See Lazar et al., supra note 55, at 228 (“Employers’ technology policies do not give carte 
blanche access to employees’ personal electronic information . . . .”). 
137 Hess, supra note 26, at 276. 
138 See id. at 276–77 (“The original balancing test created by the Supreme Court in 
[O’Connor] has eroded into a bright line rule that stresses convenience and ease of ad-
ministration over constitutionally protected rights.”). 
139 United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that “FBIS’s 
searches of Simons’ computer and office did not violate Simons’ Fourth Amendment 
rights”). 
140 See id. at 398 (“[I]n light of the Internet policy, [defendant] lacked a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the files downloaded from the Internet.”); see also Hess, supra note 26, at 
274 (“The policy in place at the FBIS negated [defendant’s] subjective expectation of pri-
vacy in his computer and allowed his employer to circumvent the protections afforded 
[defendant] by the Fourth Amendment.”). 
141 United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3 670 (5th Cir. 2002). 
142 Id. at 677. 
143 In all these cases the information that the employer obtained had been downloaded to 
employer-owned equipment.  It is, therefore, unclear whether the Court would determine 
that an employer can negate an employee’s reasonable expectation by provide notice of 
searches of external websites accessed through employer-owned equipment.  The trend 
in the case law, however, suggests that it would. 
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claims, is inconsistent with the case-by-case, fact-specific balancing 
approach intended by the O’Connor plurality.144 
Based on the way social media is used in today’s society and the 
way people perceive it as a conduit for transmitting and storing in-
formation, the courts should evaluate an individual’s reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in regards to information provided to social me-
dia sites by looking at how that information is protected by the user.  
The weight of the expectation should vary depending on the security 
measures taken by the user and not the notice provided by the em-
ployer.  Courts need to acknowledge the reality that Internet use is 
no longer inherently public and that there is a multitude of different 
measures individual’s can take to secure their online information.  
Thus, the more relevant factor should be the security measures taken 
by the employee, as opposed to the notice provided by the employer. 
D.  The New Approach:  Putting It All Together 
The new approach offered in this Comment does not seek to sup-
plant the current Fourth Amendment doctrine as applied to public 
employees.  Rather, it incorporates the realities of current Internet 
use and attempts to provide employees with only the amount of pri-
vacy protection that society has come to accept as reasonable.  This 
approach is more squarely aligned with Katz than an approach that 
precludes social media use from protection for any of the reasons 
discussed in Part VI. 
First, the Fourth Amendment will not cover Level III social media 
use because of the Third Party Doctrine.  If an employee takes no 
steps to shield their social media content from the general public, he 
or she has waived any claim of privacy.  Almost all Twitter, comment 
postings on third party websites and blog usage will not be covered 
because there is no expectation of privacy.  On the other hand, Level 
I social media use will always have an expectation of privacy.  There-
fore, Facebook messages, other forms of direct communication and 
any electronic storage on an external site will be protected even if the 
employee uses an employer-owned computer. 
Finally, under this approach Level II social media use will be the 
battleground of employment litigation.  Level II social media use will 
 
144 See Hess, supra note 26, at 275 (“[Notice], however, was not the only factor Justice 
O’Connor listed for courts to consider when evaluating an employee’s privacy expecta-
tion . . . . By stressing that employees’ privacy expectations must be determined on a case-
by-case basis, the plurality in [O’Connor] sought to avoid a bright line test in evaluating 
privacy expectations.”). 
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likely have an expectation of privacy, unless the type of employment 
is such that social media use is an integral part of employment.  A 
government employee charged with maintaining a social media web-
page, for example, most likely will not have an expectation of privacy 
as to their own profile on that same site due to the nature of their 
work.  On the other hand, an accounting employee whose social me-
dia use has no impact on his or her employment can reasonably ex-
pect that his or her social media use is private.  That expectation, 
however, can be defeated by showing the employee did not take ap-
propriate steps to secure the information contained on the social 
media site.  So if the accounting employee failed to properly secure 
his or her Facebook or MySpace profile, the legitimate interests of 
the government could be sufficient to trump his or her expectation of 
privacy. 
VII.  CRITIQUE 
“Contrary to popular belief, new technologies are not the cause of eroding 
privacy in our society . . . .”145 
The obvious question to ask even if one were to accept that em-
ployees’ social media use could be protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment is whether, as a normative matter, it should be?  This question is 
the foundation of several objections to expanding the Fourth 
Amendment to protect employee social media use.  One such argu-
ment is that social media use does not need to be protected because 
technology advances have made it sufficiently difficult for employers 
to monitor this activity.  As one scholar explains,  
over the past one hundred and fifty years, new technologies have for the 
most part enhanced our privacy, and many of the invasive surveillance 
technologies that the government now uses are simply a response to this 
enhanced level of privacy—that is, an attempt to return to the former 
balance between individual privacy and [government] needs.146   
Thus, the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protection 
should be curtailed, not expanded, in the wake of new technology. 
To some degree this argument has merit in the context of social 
media.  It is true that technology continues to provide new and more 
secure ways of protecting information on those sites.  But that alone 
does not license the government, in its capacity as employer, to in-
fringe on what has become a fundamental right.  The employer’s 
 
145 Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984:  A Broader Perspective on Technology’s Effect on Priva-
cy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 568 (2007). 
146 Id. at 531. 
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concerns are legitimate, but surely technology equally allows for em-
ployers to adequately protect themselves without the need for unre-
stricted access to online content posted by their employees. 
Another reason to protest the expansion of privacy protections is 
the detrimental impact it may have on other substantial interests.  
This argument was made to the Court in Quon.  The defendant called 
for limiting the application of the Fourth Amendment based on the 
government’s responsibility to the public.  The claim was that be-
cause “government employees often have a powerful ability to affect 
the lives of the citizens with whom they interact . . . governmental 
agencies have an obligation to monitor their employees’ activities.”147  
Under this rationale, the duty government employers owe to the pub-
lic to monitor employees’ social media outweighs their right to priva-
cy.148 
This objection has greater merit in the wake of WikiLeaks, but it is 
just an extension of a historic argument against Fourth Amendment 
protection for government employees.  The argument that the public 
good is best served by allowing government employers to conduct 
business in a way that is efficient and protects the public would defeat 
all Fourth Amendment protections for government employees.  That 
is not the approach the Court has chosen.  My argument states that if 
the Court is going to extend Fourth Amendment protections to gov-
ernment employees, then these protections should include those 
employees use of social media.  While it may be rare that the content 
and the manner in which someone puts out information on a social 
media site outweighs the government’s interest in monitoring its em-
ployees, that does not mean the protection should never exist.  The 
Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent government from being 
overly intrusive in our daily lives.  To retain this purpose, it must ex-
tend to employee information on social media websites because that 
is how the modern employee stores and communicates information. 
 
147 Brief of Amici Curiae for Los Angeles Times Communications LLC et al., Supporting Pe-
titioners at 6, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 08-1332). 
148 See id. (arguing that the obligations to the public “undercut any public employee’s claim 
to privacy in electric communications conducted on government-issued equipment”). 
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CONCLUSION 
“The Internet has provided a dramatic change in societal conditions and the 
Fourth Amendment should not be lost in cyberspace.  Society, speaking 
through its voice in Congress has shown that it objectively expects more 
protection from the Fourth Amendment than the Supreme Court, in the 
past, has been willing to give.”149 
There can no longer be any denying social media’s extreme preva-
lence and importance in our society.  In deciding Quon without re-
solving which O’Connor test will be used to determine the reasonable-
ness of an employee’s expectation of privacy, the Court left uncertain 
how the Fourth Amendment will apply to the variety of ways the In-
ternet is now being used.  Accordingly, we are left to speculate as to 
how this issue will one day be resolved.  There are obvious problems 
with attempting to outline new approaches to new technology before 
seeing how the technology will ultimately be incorporated into socie-
ty.  As Justice Kennedy cautioned, “[t]he Court must proceed with 
care when considering the whole concept of privacy expecta-
tions . . . . [t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the 
Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its 
role in society has become clear.”150  The opinion of Quon, however, 
leaves both employers and employees with little guidance on how to 
structure their relationships in light of social media’s widespread use.  
Furthermore, based solely on past decisions, it appears as though the 
Fourth Amendment would not cover social media, and that does not 
square with the reality of today’s society. 
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